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An important norm in traditional Confucian political thought
requires the government to take into account the opinions of the
people subject to its jurisdiction. That norm, however, was usually
respected only in theory but not implemented in practice. To date,
China’s model of governance has continued to be closed to outsiders,
including the governed.
The Republican and Communists’
Revolutions during the twentieth century did not fulfill their promises
to change this basic structure. China’s government remains a very
hierarchical and closed party-state structure. Such a political
structure has been variously described as “totalitarian” and
“authoritarian.”1 It can be quite efficient in policy implementation,
but it has been much weaker in terms of sensitivity and
responsiveness to public opinions and perceptions.2
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1
See, e.g., Sujian Guo, Totalitarianism: An Outdated Paradigm for Post-Mao China?,
14 J. NORTHEAST ASIAN STUD 62–90 (2015) (describing the political structure as totalitarian);
SUJIAN GUO, POST-MAO CHINA: FROM TOTALITARIANISM TO AUTHORITARIANISM? (2000)
(describing the change in political structure from totalitarian to authoritarian); JIE CHEN &
PENG DENG, CHINA SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: FROM TOTALITARIANISM TO
AUTHORITARIANISM (1995) (describing the change in political structure from totalitarian to
authoritarian). See generally Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, J. OF DEMOCRACY
6–17 (2013) (describing the political structure as authoritarian).
2
See IMD Announces the 2011 World Competitiveness Rankings and the Results of
the “Government Efficiency Gap”, INT’L INST. FOR MGMT. DEV. (May 17, 2011),
http://www.imd.org/news/IMD-announces-the-2011-World-Competitiveness-Rankingsand-the-results-of-the-Government-Efficiency-Gap.cfm [https://perma.cc/9LTN-FMQ3]
(noting that China ranks 19th in IMD’s 2011 World Competitiveness Rankings, which places
the US and Hong Kong as the most competitive countries). For instance, during the Great
Leap Forward Movement between the late 1950s and early 1960s, under the erroneous
perception of having an agricultural breakthrough and that greater grain procurement was
compatible with the peasants’ welfare, the Chinese party-state had effectively conducted
massive grain extraction, only to result in the tragic 1959–1961 famine. This is a perfect
example of high effectiveness but low responsiveness in the Chinese governing model. See
Bertein, Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great
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We argue in this Article that China’s traditional governing
model is changing. The development of a market economy and the
diversification of interests in Chinese society have undermined the
foundation of the old governing model and its rejection of much input
from outside the party-state. Both the general public and the
leadership have recognized the old model’s practical shortcomings
under current conditions. Local officials have launched experiments
of administrative reform, one feature of which is to respect and
protect people’s rights to participate in government administration.
As a result of these experiments, local governments have become
more responsive to the public in dealing with public affairs. These
developments imply that a new model of governance may be
emerging in China.
We identify two models of administrative governance in
China: the traditional “managerial model” and the emerging
“participatory model.” We focus our discussion on administrative
decision-making processes because of the central role they play in
administrative governance.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we define the
main features and flaws of the managerial model. In Part II, we
analyze the failures of the traditional model and the emergence of a
new, participatory model through the use of case studies. In Part III,
we consider in more detail the characteristics of the emerging new
model, including its political legitimacy, essential values and
institutional components.

I. THE MANAGERIAL MODEL AND ITS FAILINGS
The longstanding model of decision-making in China was
based on a planned economy and centralized political system (with
deep roots in the politics and bureaucratic structures of imperial
times). Although in the reform era China has largely shifted to a
market economy, this decision-making model remains relevant and

Leap Forward, THEORY & SOCIETY 362–65 (1984) (describing the famine). For policy
implementation in the reform era, see DAVID M. LAMPTON, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN
POST-MAO CHINA (1987) (detailing the policy implementation in post-Mao China). For the
general descriptions to the problems of the lack of sensitivity and responsiveness of Chinese
administration, the research could be found widely from the research of Chinese
authoritarianism, Andrew J. Nathan, supra note 1.
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even dominant. We call it the “managerial model,” whose basic
features can be summarized as follows:3
1.
In terms of ideology, the party-state bureaucracy is
regarded as the representative of the public interest and the arbiter of
the common good; individuals and social groups are considered to
represent partial and parochial interests. The party-state governs and
the people are the governed.
2.
In terms of organizational structure, the arrangement
is pyramidal, bureaucratic and hierarchical. Decision-making
agendas and goals are passed down from higher to lower levels.
Lower levels have little authority and incentive to respond to public
opinion and demand. Cadres at the lower levels of the party-state are
often ordered to achieve rigidly defined targets, and are evaluated
based on their fulfillment of those targets.
3.
In terms of agenda-setting in day-to-day governance,
the party-state bureaucracy and its affiliated think tanks are dominant.
The public has little opportunity to influence the agenda-setting
except for filing petitions—or seeking for media attention—which
the authorities can often ignore.
4.
In collecting and controlling the information flow that
is vital to governance, the party-state decision-making bodies usually
steer the process, initiating investigation and consultation as they see
fit. The public therefore may be consulted, but there is no process to
guarantee that decision-making agencies will respond to public input
or that issues of concern to significant parts of the public will reach
the decision-makers. More often than not, information that the
government collects and that shapes its decisions is kept within the
party-state’s decision-making bodies. If such information is
disclosed to the public, the purpose is often to mobilize the people to
help implement policy and the disclosure is typically highly selective.
5.
To the extent that public input is encouraged or
allowed, it generally must be expressed and represented through
officially designated channels, for example, villagers through Village
Committees, women through Women’s Associations, young people
through Youth League organs, workers through official labor unions,
3
The following observation draws from our previous work. See Wang Xixin & Zhang
Yongle, Woguo Xingzheng Juece Moshi Zhi Zhuanxing¾Cong Guanli Zhuyi Moshi Dao
Canyushi Zhili Moshi (我国行政决策模式之转型¾从管理主义模式到参与式治理模式)
[The Transformation of Chinese Model of Decision-Making¾from Managerial Model to
Model of Participatory Governance], 5 ZUEL L. J. (2012).
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and so on. Unauthorized associations and expressions of opinion on
matters of policy and governance are discouraged (even when
officially approved channels frequently function poorly).
6.
To foster public acceptance of official policy (which
party-state authorities recognize is helpful in reducing the costs of
implementing policies), decision-making bodies often try to shape the
policy preference of the general public through political and social
mobilization.4 If such efforts prove ineffective, it rarely prompts a
change in policy, unless decision-makers conclude that the cost of
implementing a policy that has failed to win public acceptance is
simply too high. Yet overall decision-making bodies rarely modify
the original decision in response to the public’s policy preferences.
7.
The
decision-making
process
offers
only
underdeveloped mechanisms for receiving feedback or correcting
errors. Public input that contradicts the preference of decisionmakers is generally not welcomed. The public’s options are usually
limited to trying to bypass the local-level or immediately relevant
authorities to complain to higher authorities. But lower-level
authorities are often able to suppress this kind of “leapfrog petition.”
When complaints do reach and persuade higher level leaders, even
the top leadership has often to rely on ad hoc political mobilization
within the bureaucracy to rectify errors and change policy
implementation.
We call this model “managerial” because governance is
reduced essentially to decision-making agencies’ top-down
management. Decision-making agencies shape the public’s policy
preferences, while the policy preferences of the public do not have
any effective mechanism to influence the agencies’ decisions. During
China’s struggle for national independence (through the 1940s) and
its period of rapid industrialization (which began during the 1950s),
the managerial model was effective in “pooling resources of all sides
for accomplishing large undertakings.”5 With its ability to achieve
firm resolution of policy issues and strict discipline in implementing
4
During this political process, a mobilization model came into being, which political
scientists call “participatory mobilization.” In participatory mobilization, leaders try to
inspire the enthusiasm of the masses, but do not expect pre-arranged guidelines,
strategies/principles, and policies to be changed. Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), Zhengfu Gongzuo
Baogao (政府工作报告) [Report on the Work of the Government] (2002); XINHUANET,
http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm
[https://perma.cc/A67LW2ZN] (last visited Sep. 27, 2017).
5
Id.
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policies, this system built a solid foundation for China’s economic
and social development. Even under the planned economy, however,
the managerial model’s serious defects were evident. The party and
government bureaucracy tended to become an autonomous group that
was relatively unresponsive to society. This tendency was also a
breeding ground to corruption in the party-state. Many commentators
agree that during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Mao Zedong
launched mass campaigns in an effort to reinvigorate the bureaucracy
and to make it more responsive to the people. But his radical
prescription failed disastrously. It led to full-scale chaos and
paralysis of the party, the state and society. In the end, it did not
displace the traditional managerial model.6
In December 1978, the Third Plenum of the 11th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made economic
development the top policy priority for the party-state.7 But reform
of the decision-making system was not yet on the agenda. The
managerial model continued to function reasonably well in some
respects from the early 1980s, when pro-development policies
combined with policies of fiscal decentralization have given local
governments strong incentives to develop the local economy and
thereby to increase their revenues through capturing some of the gains
from rapid growth.8 Still working within the managerial model, local
governments shifted their entrepreneurial energy from the political
realm to the economic realm, mobilizing financial, human, and
institutional resources to promote local economic development. This
“local state corporatism” greatly enhanced China’s economic
dynamism. 9 Competition among local governments for better
6
See HARRY HARDIN, ORGANIZING CHINA: THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY (1981)
(explaining how the efforts to improve the bureaucracy were not beneficial); YICHING WU,
CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE MARGINS: CHINESE SOCIALISM IN CRISIS (2014) (showing the
problems with bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution). For a different view on Mao’s
anti-bureaucratic agenda for the Cultural Revolution, see MARTIN K. WHYTE, WHO HATES
BUREAUCRACY? A CHINESE PUZZLE (1984) (explaining a different opinion—that improving
the bureaucracy was not what Mao Zedong intended).
7
Xi explains China’s reform plan, XINHUANET (Nov. 16, 2013),
http://china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30619850.htm
[https://perma.cc/5NR9-D39D].
8
See Justin Yifu Lin & Zhiqiang Liu, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth
in China, 49 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1 (2000) (explaining and describing how
the economy was developed).
9
See Jean C. Oi, RURAL CHINA TAKES OFF: INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC REFORM 139 (1999) (explaining how the Chinese economy grew).
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economic performance in their localities helped achieve the
astonishing “China speed” of development, but it also exposed
weaknesses in the traditional model of governance. First, as rapid
development produced high social and environmental costs, local
governments often responded by trying to avoid the “fiscal burdens”
of dealing with the resulting problems, especially as growth in local
government revenues slowed or declined. This in turn led to the
shrinking of budgets for public services and social welfare, the
widening of the disparities between the rich and the poor, and serious
environmental degradation. Moreover, operating with great
discretionary powers inside an essentially closed system, party cadres
and state officials were particularly susceptible to corruption.10
Predictably, the development of the market economy and the
resulting pluralization of social interests have gradually undermined
the foundation of the managerial model. It has become increasingly
difficult to identify “the public interest” or “the common good” in this
more complex environment. At the same time, the party-state’s status
as the authoritative representative of the public interest and definer of
the common good has become more and more contested. With the
development of the internet and other changes that have made it
easier and cheaper to collect, disseminate and exchange information
and views, members of the public have a greater opportunity to assert
their interests and express their policy preferences. 11 As Wang
Shaoguang points out, in recent years, ordinary citizens’ agendasetting capacity has increased significantly.12 The party-state and its
think tanks can no longer dominate public discourse and monopolize
agenda-setting. Citizens are increasingly outspoken in criticizing
public policies and putting pressure on decision-making agencies to
10
See Xiaobo Zhang, Fiscal Decentralization and Political Centralization in China:
Implications for Growth and Inequality, 34 J. COMP. ECON. 713 (2006) (explaining how the
government policies aligned with the fiscal policies to create a potential for increasing gaps
in equality).
11
According to the 22nd Statistical Report of China’s Internet Development published
by China Internet Network Information Center, by June 2008, China’s Internet users have
reached 253 million, rated as number one in the world. 22nd Statistical Report of China’s
Internet Development, CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER 8 (June 2008),
http://www.cnnic.cn/gywm/zzkw/cnnicndbg/201206/P020120612352143162427.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VH3T-S35J]. Moreover, the amplitude of Internet users is surprisingly
large: in the first six months of 2008, China’s Internet users have increased by forty-three
million. Id.
12
Shaoguang Wang, Changing Models of China’s Policy Agenda Setting, 34 MODERN
CHINA 56, 59 (2008).
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reflect their preferences and address their concerns. 13 Greater
recognition of citizens’ rights to association has brought about a
significant increase in the number of social organizations14 and has
strengthened citizens’ capacity to take collective action.
With these changes, the managerial model has become
increasingly inadequate and unsustainable. First, as will be shown in
our case studies below, in a more pluralistic and complex society,
decision-making agencies face more challenges in grasping the
“public interest” that must inform their policymaking. They need to
understand the ever-changing structure of, and the relationships
among, increasingly diverse interests and groups in society.
Approaches under the managerial model¾such as governmentinitiated unidirectional investigation—are often incapable of
gathering and interpreting the information necessary for informed
and effective decision-making. Second, the increased ability of the
general public to articulate and assert its interests, evaluate policies,
and undertake collective action means that the policies must attain a
higher level of public acceptance if they are to be effective. A policy
that contradicts the preferences of the public may well face fatal
public resistance to its implementation. Cooperation from the general
public has become much more important for policy implementation
than before. The most effective and reliable way to secure the
public’s cooperation is to attend to the public’s policy preferences
throughout the process of policy-making—something the managerial
model has difficulty in achieving. Third, China’s transition from a
“shortage economy” to a much more prosperous society has provided
interest groups with greater incentives and abilities to “capture”
policymaking bodies.
The managerial model is particularly
vulnerable to capture, and corruption, because of its low levels of
transparency and openness to input by a wider public.15 Such capture
13

Id. at 70–73.
Shaoguang Wang & Jianyu He, Associational Revolution in China: Mapping the
Landscapes, 35 KOREA OBSERVER 1 (2004); see also Gao Bingzhong & Yuan Ruijun,
ZHONGGUO GONGMIN SHEHUI FAZHAN LANPI SHU [THE BLUEBOOK CONCERNING CHINA’S
NATIONAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT] (2008) (discussing the social development and some of
the social organizations).
15
It is widely agreed in the literature on regulatory capture that increased transparency
can reduce the likelihood of agency capture. See e.g. DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS,
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
(2013) (explaining how to limit the likelihood of regulatory capture). See China GDP: How
It
Has
Changed
Since
1980,
GUARDIAN,
14
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and corruption can give rise to public discontent, which undermines
the government’s legitimacy and capacity to implement policies.
China’s ruling party and the central government have already
become very aware of the urgent need to carry out political and
administrative reforms to address these problems associated with the
managerial model. Reforms to expand citizens’ participation in
political and administrative processes have constituted a key part of
the agenda. The official Report of the 16th National Congress of the
CCP called for the party to “improve democratic institutions, develop
diverse forms of democracy, expand citizens’ orderly political
participation, protect people’s right to democratic election,
democratic decision-making, democratic management and
democratic supervision, safeguard people’s extensive rights and
freedom, respect and protect human rights.”16 The Report of the 17th
Party Congress committed to “improve transparency and public
participation in decision-making and publicly consult the people
when making laws, regulations and public policies that are closely
related to the interest of the people.”17 In the Report on Government
Work at the second session of the 10th National People’s Congress
(NPC), Premier Wen Jiabao stated that the government should:
[I]nsist upon democratic and scientific decisionmaking, develop a decision-making mechanism that
combines public participation, expert consultation and
government
decision-making,
guarantee
the
scientificness and correctness of policies, accelerate
the construction and improvement of collective
decision-making system for major issues, expert
consultation system, public scrutiny and hearing
system, and decision-making accountability system.
All important issues must be decided through
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/mar/23/china-gdp-since-1980
[https://perma.cc/L2Z9-KCWM] (last visited May 19, 2017) (stating that China’s GDP in
2012 is more than thirty times comparing to GDP in 1978).
16
Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at 16th Party Congress, 16TH CONGRESS,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm [https://perma.cc/TM6D-3HQ5] (last
visited Apr. 7, 2015).
17
Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress, BEIJING REVIEW (Oct. 24 ,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/25/content_83051.htm
2007),
[https://perma.cc/KE9Z-FYUE].
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collective discussion based upon intensive
investigation, extensive consultation of opinions, and
sufficient scientific evidence. This should be a basic
working rule of the government that is to be insisted
upon over the long term.18
Against this background, a series of administrative reforms
emerged in many localities, which finally ring the death knell of the
managerial model. Under all of these local reform experiments,
decision-making
authorities
have
ceded—voluntarily
or
involuntarily—part of their decision-making power to the general
public. In some places, this revised sharing of decision-making
power even received institutional endorsement.
In the next Part, we examine several concrete examples of
how the managerial model failed and gave way to new practices of
governance and administration. The cases discussed here occurred
during a relatively recent two-year period, and include: Xiamen city
resolving the “PX crisis” (concerning the siting of a polluting plant)
through public participation;19 the Shanghai municipal government
listening to the opinions of residents concerning a magnetic levitation
railway program;20 the Chongqing government resolving a strike by
taxi drivers through constructive conversations with them; 21 and
Hunan province adopting an administrative procedure regulation
which prescribes public participation for major decision-making
(zhongda xingzheng juece). 22 There are many other similar cases
18

Premier Wen’s Government Work Report, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2004),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/16/eng20040316_137651.shtml
[https://perma.cc/K9ZT-LMMT].
19
For the report of the event, see Chinese Residents Force Relocation of Chemical
NONVIOLENT
ACTION
DATABASE,
Plants
in
Xiamen,
2007,
GLOBAL
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-residents-force-relocation-chemicalplant-xiamen-2007 [https://perma.cc/9LWK-KXS5] (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (providing
background information regarding the relocation of chemical plants in Xiamen city in 2007).
20
For the report, see Royston Chan & Sophie Taylor, Hundreds Protect Shanghai
Maglev Rail Extension, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/12/us-chinamaglev-protest-idUSPEK32757920080112 [https://perma.cc/2SQ9-XUBH] (last visited Jan.
12, 2008) (providing examples of how the public influenced the railway program).
21
For the report, see Sky Canaves, Cab Drivers Stage Strike in China City, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 4, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122573906150693971
[https://perma.cc/KJ4A-X9XV] (describing the strike).
22
See Jamie P. Horsley, Public Participation in the People’s Republic: Developing a
More Participatory Governance Model in China, YALE L. REV. (2009) (explaining the
different methods of decision-making).
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across the China, some of which predate those analyzed in this
article.23 We choose to analyze these four recent cases here because
they are particularly revealing about the differences between the
traditional “managerial” and emerging “participatory” models of
governance, the complexity of the transition from the old model to
the new model, and the structural components of the new model.

II. CASE STUDIES OF THE DECLINE OF THE MANAGERIAL
MODEL AND RISE OF THE PARTICIPATORY MODEL
1. The PX Crisis in Xiamen
The PX crisis in Xiamen is a landmark in the history of rising
public participation in China’s administrative governance. Facing
criticism and street protests against a planned chemical plant, the
municipal government responded constructively, listening to
resident’s opinions and eventually changing its original decision.24
In early 2001, two Taiwan corporations applied to the Xiamen
municipal government to construct a PX project with annual
productive capacity of the chemical at 800,000 tons in the Haicang
Economic Development Zone. 25
The Haicang Economic
23
For example, the “democratic talkfest” practice in Taizhou City, Zhejiang Province
emerged in late 1990s. See generally TAIZHOU DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA, JICENG
MINZHU ZHENGZHI JIANSHE: ZHEJIANG SHENG TAIZHOU SHI MINZHU KENTAN YANJIU
[BUILDING GRASSROOT DEMOCRACY: THE RESEARCH TO THE DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIVE
MEETING IN TAIZHOU CITY IN ZHEJIANG PROVINCE] (2003) (discussing democratic practices
in a particular province); see also Lang Youxing Shangyi Minzhu yu Zhongguo de Difang
Jingyan: Zhejiang Wenling shi de ‘Minzhu Kentanhui’ [Deliberative Democracy and
Chinese Local Experience: ‘Democratic Talkfest’ in Taizhou, Zhejiang], in XIESHANG
MINZHU DE FAZHAN: XIESHANG MINZHU LILUN YU ZHONGGUO DIFANG MINZHU GUOJI
XUESHU YANTAO HUI LUN WENJI [THE DEVELOPMENT OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
ANTHOLOGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE THEORY OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA] 206–16 (2006) (discussing democratic
practices and how they have developed).
24
For other systematic discussions about this case, see generally WANG XIXIN,
GONGZHONGCANYU HE ZHONGGUO XINGONGGONGYUNDONG de XINGQI [PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION AND THE RISING OF NEW PUBLIC MOVEMENT IN CHINA] (2008) (explaining
how change in the involvement of the public came about historically).
25
See also Tian feilong: Gongzhong Canyu de Shidai Biaoben—Xiamen PX Shijian de
Guocheng Fenxi yu Moshi Guina (公众参与的时代标本——厦门 PX 事件的过程分析与
模式归纳) [A SAMPLE OF PARTICIPATION ERA: THE PROCESS AND MODEL OF THE PROTEST
FOR PX INDUSTRIAL PROJECT IN XIAMEN] in GONGZHONG CANYU YU ZHONGZHONG
XINGONGGONG YUNDONG DE XINGQI [PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND THE RISE OF CHINA’S NEW
PUBLIC MOVEMENT] (2008) (examining the protest in Xiamen).
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Development Zone was established in 1990 specifically for chemical
industries. The zone struggled. Although twenty square kilometers
in the zone were set aside to attract investment from the famous
Taiwanese tycoon Wang Yongqing, the effort proved unsuccessful.26
During the following decade, only a few chemical companies moved
into the zone and carried out only small-scale production.27 Around
2000, Haicang became a hot spot for residential real estate
development. In this case, with so many homes in the area, the
establishment of a large chemical factory might well pose health risks
to public health.
The Xiamen government welcomed the PX project because it
promised to provide considerable fiscal revenue. The government
followed proper procedures in approving the project, conducting an
environmental impact evaluation. 28 In March 2007, when the
Chinese central government’s annual “Two Meetings”—the plenary
sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), respectively—
were being held in Beijing, 105 CPPCC members, led by Professor
Zhao Yufen, a member of the Chinese Academy of Science,
submitted a proposal to the CPPCC annual meeting, seeking to
relocate the PX project by arguing that the project would cause
significant environmental pollution.29 This proposal soon became the
most celebrated proposal of that year’s CPPCC session and also
immediately attracted the attention of Xiamen residents, especially
homeowners in the “Future Seashore” estate in the Haicang
Economic Development Zone.30 Such information was disseminated

26

Id.
Id.
28
See Xiamen PX Xiangmu Huoyou Renda Paiban (厦门 PX 项目或由人大拍板) [The
Local People Congress may decide the Xiamen PX project], 厦 门 , CAIJING.COM,
http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-12-15/100041974.html
[https://perma.cc/Q52R-Y7LP]
(outlining a comprehensive environmental impact evaluation).
29
See Xiamen Baiyi Huagong Xiangmu Cheng Lianghui Jinji Yian Bei Zanhuan Pizhun
(厦门百亿化工项目成两会紧急议案被暂缓批准) [The Xiamen Chemical Industrial
Program Cost Tens of Billions Led to a Urgent Bill, The Project was Suspended], SOHU (Mar.
19, 2007), http://news.sohu.com/20070319/n248820116.shtml [https://perma.cc/A4YV82JL] (proposing relocation of PX project).
30
See Xiamen PX Shijian [Xiamen PX Protest] SINA, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/200709-27/165713986641.shtml [https://perma.cc/5XL5-24HB] (noting Xiamen residents’
approval of proposal to relocate PX project).
27
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quickly among Xiamen residents through the internet and cell phones,
resulting in widespread public worry and even panic.
The Xiamen municipal government responded swiftly. On
May 28, 2007, the director general of the Xiamen Environmental
Protection Bureau openly addressed the rising concerns about the
potential pollution of the PX project in an interview published in the
official municipal party newspaper Xiamen Daily. The next day the
CEO of the company in charge of the PX project published a long
article in Xiamen Evening defending the project. On May 30, Ding
Guoyan, Xiamen’s vice mayor, held a press conference to announce
the postponement of the project.31
Extraordinary though these steps were, they failed to satisfy
the public. On June 1, thousands of residents demonstrated at the PX
project construction site and another road in the nearby residential
area. Citizens called their collective action “going for a walk” rather
than a “demonstration” or “protest,” which might receive a much less
tolerant response from local authorities. 32 The collective “walk”
lasted until the nightfall of the next day. No physical conflict
occurred. Later in June, the Xiamen government asked the Chinese
Academy of Environmental Science (CAES) to conduct an
environmental evaluation of Xiamen’s municipal planning. 33 The
CAES report, released for public consultation on December 5, 2007,
posited two conflicting identities for Haicang: on the one hand, it is
identified as a chemical industrial zone; on the other hand, it is
recognized as an area famous for its scenery and vital tourism sector.
The public consultation process involved a two-day public forum on
environmental evaluation held from December 13 to 14. Two days
before that, more than 100 representatives of the public were selected
to participate through a voluntary sign-up and televised lottery. The
forum included invited government officials, twenty-one experts and
more than 100 resident public representatives. Almost 90% of
resident representatives opposed the PX program. The forum was
broadcast live on local television. Zhu Zilu, the Xiamen city
31

Id.
Xiamen, supra note 30.
33
Zhonguo Huanjing Kexueyuan Huifu Xiamen PX Xiangmu “Gongzhong canyu”
Yijian (中国环境科学院回复厦门 PX 项目 “公众参与” 意见) [China Academy of
Environmental Science Respond to the Opinions from Public Participation of Xiamen PX
Project],
ENORTH.COM
(Dec.
19,
2007),
http://it.big5.enorth.com.cn/system/2007/12/19/002517134.shtml.
32
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government deputy secretary-general, acknowledged that this forum
was unprecedented in terms of its transparency and procedural
openness. Ultimately, the Xiamenm government reconsidered its
approval of the PX project, and later the project was relocated to
Gulei Peninsula in Zhangzhou, about seventy kilometers from
Xiamen.34
The Xiamen PX case makes it clear that the legality of an
administrative decision to approve a project is not alone sufficient for
the decision to be accepted by the public and, in the end, implemented.
Other conditions are necessary as well, and the managerial model of
administrative governance employed by the Xiamen municipal
government was ill-suited to realize those conditions. First, whether
a decision is reasonable in substance is significant as well, and input
from those with expertise is important to making that determination.
In the case of the PX project, the Xiamen PX project did go through
all the legally required procedures. The PX project was approved by
the National Bureau of Environmental Protection, as required by
relevant laws and regulations.35 The Bureau has a mandate only to
conduct environmental evaluations of particular projects, but not to
consider the broader contexts, including other aspects of municipal
planning that affect the environment. The latter falls under the
jurisdiction of the municipal government.36 This limitation on the
Bureau’s power leaves too much discretion to local government to
ignore environmental issues. 37 Once members of the public
mobilized to resist the PX project, the Xiamen government sought
additional input from relevant experts in the relevant field. But the
purpose of the municipal government’s entrusting the China
Academy of Environmental Science to conduct an environmental
evaluation was to use third-party expertise to enhance the credibility
of the government’s decision to approve the project. Therefore, the
34

Id.
Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa ( 环 境 影 响 评 价 法 ) [Environment Impact
Assessment Law], art. 23 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct.
28, 2002, effective Sep. 1, 2003).
36
Id. art. 7–8.
37
See Tian Feilong,(田飞龙), Cong “Shumu” Dao “Senlin”: Guihua Huanping Lifa
de Zhili Shiming (从 “树木” 到 “森林”: 规划环评立法的治理使命) [From Trees to Forests:
the Mission of Legislation on Environmental Evaluation of Planning] in Gonggong Canyu
Guancha [Public Participation Watch], RESEARCH CTR. FOR GOV’T. BY LAW (Nov. 25, 2007),
http://law.china.cn/features/2007-11/25/content_2994671.htm.
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government was still following the managerial model, and even then
its effort fell short because the evaluation report concluded that the
problem was one of municipal planning which environmental experts
could not resolve.38
Second, the PX case shows that the acceptability to the public
of certain policy initiatives does matter, and that the managerial
model has difficulties in achieving just that. As mentioned, perhaps
to the government’s surprise, the local people rose up against the PX
project, mobilizing themselves through cell phones and the internet.
After becoming aware of people’s fear and discontent, the
government tried to reshape public opinion through official media.
This strategy failed, and the crisis deepened as it turned out
unsuccessful in defusing public concerns. This set of events calls into
question the premise that decision-making agencies “naturally”
represent the public interest.
Moreover, it also demonstrates the shortcomings of a system
that does not provide institutionalized channels for members of the
public to express their views of the public interest. Ordinary Chinese
people have very limited channels to file complaints and express
concerns to the government. The main function of the “letters and
visits” (xinfang) system is to provide information to officials.39 Yet
this function is realized only to a limited extent because individual
xinfang petitions rarely attract the attention of high-level decisionmakers.40 Opportunities for organized collective action are limited
as well. Although the PRC Constitution promises in Article 35 the
right to demonstrate and protest, exercise of this right is constrained
in practice. The same is true for the constitutional right to association
prescribed in the same article, as it is very difficult to formally
establish non-governmental organizations to represent citizens’
interests. In the PX case, the residents in Xiamen developed an
ingenious strategy to bypass these limitations. The residents
established informal networks rather than formal organizations, and
38
Wang Xixin & Zhang Yongle, Experts, The Public and Use of Knowledge: An
Analytical Framework for Administrative Rule Making, 3 SOC. SCI. IN CHINA 113 (2003).
39
For a source describing the “letters and visits” system in China, see generally KEVIN
J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA (2006) (showing that
the function of the “letters and visits system” is for information gathering and dispersal
among officials).
40
Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42
STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006).
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did not “protest” but merely “walked” together.41 In this way, they
did not directly challenge the government’s authority and they
expressed their concerns and opposition without making government
officials lose face. Hence, they did not elicit the kind of pushback
from local authorities commonly seen in cases of street protest.
Eventually, the two-day public forum helped the government
come to a policy decision that ultimately won public acceptance.
Although the public forum was only an ad hoc arrangement and just
for consultation, it enhanced procedural transparency and fairness in
decision-making and opened up a space for each side to express its
opinions. At the forum, opponents of the PX project asked the
government to consider, among other topics, the following: the
conflict between the project and the need to preserve Xiamen’s value
as a seashore tourism site; the failure of the project to satisfy national
energy-saving and emissions reduction criteria; and the potential that
the PX project could produce serious pollution and other harm. 42
Proponents of the project called for striking a balance between
economic development and environmental protection, and asked
whether there were special interest groups behind the protest.43 On
both sides, citizens actively participated in administrative decisionmaking.
In summary, the Xiamen PX case involved a spontaneous
effort by members of the public to organize themselves around
informal networks and protest against unreasonable or undesired
(rather than illegal) administrative decisions in an institutional
environment that was unfriendly to public participation. The
government responded to this effort in a moderate way, offering
innovative channels for public participation and dialogue between the
government and citizens to resolve the crisis. Although the PX crisis
did not result in an institutionalized mechanism for participatory
41

Liu Xianghui & Zhou Lina (刘向晖 & 周丽娜), Baowei Xiamen Faqizhe Jiangshu
Xiamen PX Shijian Shimo) (保卫厦门发起者讲述厦门 PX 事件始末) [Organizer of the
Defending Xiamen Campaign Tells the Story of Xiamen PX Incident], SINA.COM (Dec. 28,
2007,
10:13
AM),
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-12-28/101314622140.shtml
[https://perma.cc/DG9Y-WU6C].
42
Zhu Hongjun, Huanping Zuotanhui Quan Jilu: “Wo Shisi Hanwei Ni Shuohua de
Quanli” (环评座谈会全记录:“我誓死捍卫你说话的权利”) [Full record of the Forum of
Environmental Evaluation: “I Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It”], SINA.COM (Dec.
20, 2007, 10:38 AM), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-12-20/103814564723.shtml
[https://perma.cc/N82E-YSC9].
43
Wang & Zhang, supra note 38.
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decision-making, it does indicate a shift in Xiamen away from
Xiamen’s managerial model of administrative decision-making,
toward a more open and participatory process. The result was a “winwin” situation: the crisis of a growing confrontation between citizens
and the government was resolved peacefully, members of the public
saw their concerns addressed, and the government’s authority was
preserved.
2. Extension of the PX Crisis model: the Magnetic Levitation Crisis
in Shanghai
Shortly after the PX case arose in Xiamen, a similar set of
events emerged in Shanghai, with roots that dated back to early
2007. 44 On January 18, 2007, the Shanghai Magnetic Levitation
Company submitted an environmental evaluation report to the
National Bureau of Environmental Protection for approval of the
construction of a magnetic levitation railway to connect the city’s two
airports. The completion time was set to be for 2010, when the
Shanghai Expo 2010 would take place. The Report, which was made
available online, revealed that the railway would be allowed to come
within twenty-five meters of residential buildings.45 Worried about
the health effects of possibly living too close to a source of magnetic
radiation, local residents began to lodge complaints with the
authorities through the “letters and visits” system.46 In mid-March,
the National Bureau of Environment Protection sent a delegation to
Shanghai’s Minhang District to evaluate the environmental report
submitted by the magnetic levitation railway company. More than
5000 residents went to the district government to submit petitions
concerning the report. Their challenge was based on procedural
grounds, suggesting that the report was neither published in the media
nor posted in residential areas, and therefore, it did not meet the
44

Gongzhong Danxin Dianci Wuran Shanghai Cixuanfu Youhua Fang’an Rengzao
Zhiyi (公众担心电磁污染 上海磁悬浮优化方案仍遭质疑) [The Public Still Worries
about Magnetic Pollution], QQ.COM (Jan. 14, 2008, 9:36 AM),
http://finance.qq.com/a/20080114/001399.htm [https://perma.cc/24ZP-AYND].
45
Id.
46
Zhang Feng’an & Li Peng (张凤安 & 李芃), Shanghai Cixuanfu Gongsi Kudeng
Sannian Kui Shi Yi, Huanjing cheng Zuida Tiaozhan (上海磁悬浮公司苦等三年亏 10 亿
环境成最大挑战) [The Shanghai Magnetic Levitation Waited for Three Years and Suffered
More than One Billon Lost: The Environment has been the Biggest Challenge], SOHU (Jan.
15,
2008,
12:35
AM),
http://news.sohu.com/20080115/n254654327.shtml
[https://perma.cc/SK6C-3NZH].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/4

40

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 13]

requirement of transparency. Also in March, officials of the Minhang
district government, together with many experts, went to local
communities to talk with individual residents in an effort to make up
for the lack of public participation in the initial decision-making
process. Two months later, the residents were notified that the project
was postponed. On December 29, the Shanghai Bureau of City
Planning published online an amended project plan open for public
comment until January 18, 2008. According to the amended plan, the
railway line would be shortened from 34.8 km to 31.8 km. One part
of the line would be relocated closer to a river, and farther away from
residential areas, while the other part would be built underground.
Nonetheless, local residents opposed the revised program. They
contended that the revised standard of thirty meters between the train
line and residential areas was still inadequate because it was shorter
than the fifty meter distance which was the common practice in China,
and far short of the German standard of 300–500 meters. 47 An
environmental evaluation of the amended program, posted on the
official website “Shanghai Environment Hotline” for public
consultation between January 2 and January 15 concluded that the
magnetic radiation from the proposed railway met relevant standards
and was safe. 48 This conclusion, too, immediately drew public
opposition. Some residents with expertise in relevant fields argued
that the computational method used in the environmental evaluation
report was inappropriate and failed to reflect the risks accurately.49
Residents soon mobilized themselves in efforts to make their
voices heard.50 Similar to the PX case in Xiamen, the participants
were careful to avoid any provocative labels such as “protest” or
“demonstration.” Some residents gathered at Ganghui Plaza under
the rubric of “shopping together” at Guanghui Plaza on January 6.
Six days later, they gathered again for the purpose of “taking a walk”
through the People’s Square, and then on busier adjacent streets,
including the famous Nanjing Road. The protest was largely peaceful
47

Id.
Yang Wanguo, Shanghai Cheng Jiang Lunzheng Cixuanfu Gongzhong Yijian (上海
称将论证磁悬浮公众意见) [Shanghai Says Public Opinions on Magnetic Levitation will
be
Evaluated],
FENGHUANGNET
(Jan.
19,
2008,
3:31
AM),
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200801/0119_17_370675.shtml [https://perma.cc/4DHX437L].
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and provoked no conflict between protesters and the police. On the
same day as the People’s Park Square and Nanjing Road protests, the
Shanghai Center for Radioactive Environment Monitoring Center
responded to residents’ requests and conducted a test at the magnetic
levitation railway’s model line, with representatives of the residents
present. The representatives later used the result of the test to
challenge the accuracy of the magnetic levitation railway company’s
original environmental evaluation report.51
The local government responded as follows.52 On January 7,
Chen Jun, the head of the Minhang district government, went to the
site of the magnetic levitation railway model line with officials from
various district departments and consulted twelve resident
representatives. On the evening of January 8, the Letters and Visits
Office of the Minhang district government organized a meeting that
included magnetic levitation experts, district officials, and resident
representatives to address the following controversial issues: how to
conduct public consultation on the proposed project; the time period
for consultation; the negative impacts of the project including noise,
vibration, and radiation pollution; and the potential infringement of
the property rights of local residents. The district government
subsequently established four public consultation centers. Many
residents discontinued their “walking” protests and turned to these
centers to voice their concerns. On January 18, a public notice was
published on both “Shanghai Environment Hotline” and the official
portal of the Shanghai Bureau of City Planning, expressing the local
authorities’ appreciation of the active participation of residents
during the period of consultation and encouraging local residents to
continue communicating with the government after the comment
period. Although the government rejected residents’ request to
extend the period of public comment and hold a public hearing on
this issue, it did demonstrate a willingness to consult with the
public.53
The pattern apparent in the Shanghai magnetic levitation
railway case is similar to that of the Xiamen PX case: at the initial
stage, decision-making bodies did not take into account the policy
preferences of local residents, and thus missed an opportunity to build
public acceptance of the policies. This was particularly obvious in
51
52
53
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the local government’s approach to soliciting public comment: the
initial announcement was published online but not in other media
such as newspapers or posted in the residential communities. The
local government therefore appeared to seek to keep a low profile and
to avoid the attention of local residents. Once local residents became
aware of the matter, they mobilized swiftly to pursue collective action,
including “letters and visits,” “shopping together,” “going for a walk,”
and so on. These protests created a public crisis which the
government could not ignore. Pressure from the public thus had a
substantial impact on the government’s agenda-setting.
Over the two-year course of the controversy, the local
government shifted significantly from passive listening to the public
(if at all) toward active consultation with the people. Once members
of the affected public started to see “letters and visits” as an
ineffective means to express their concerns and moved to more
protest-like tactics, the government became more willing to engage
in “listening to opinions in an open manner.”54 Effective dialogue
and communication ensued.55 Eventually the proposed project never
materialized. Apparently, after the public row, relevant authorities
understood that they needed to consider the acceptability to the public
of their policy decision and to take into account the preferences of the
public in their decision-making.
3. Taxi Drivers’ Strike in Chongqing
On November 3, 2008, more than 8000 taxi drivers went on
strike in the city of Chongqing to protest their exploitation by taxi
companies. 56 The strike was a result of the power imbalances
between employers and employees in Chongqing’s taxi industry. In
many Chinese cities, including Chongqing, the taxi industry is
regulated by a licensing system: the government sells licenses to taxi
54

See Guangzhou Guizhang Zhiding Gongzhong Canyu Banfa (广州市规章制定公众
参 与 办 法 ) [Guangzhou Provisions on Public Participation in Rule-Making],
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-PPFinal_GZ_PP_Measures_%28Chinese%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ3D-DCRA]
(“Listening to opinions in an open manner means that undertaking department listens to
public opinions in a certain period of time and in appointed places.”).
55
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Chongqing Yongchuan Fasheng Chuzuche Tingyun Shijian (重庆永川发生出租车
停运事件) [Taxi Drivers’ Strike happens in Yongchuan, Chongqing], XINHUANET (Nov. 19,
2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-11/19/content_10381564_1.htm.
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companies, which then assign the licenses to individual taxis and
lease the licensed taxis to drivers, charging high fees.57 As a result,
the bulk of the income from taxi fares goes to the taxi companies,
resulting in a distribution that many drivers regard as unfair.58
The second day into the strike, the Chongqing government
held the first of five press conferences in a four-day period. 59 It
publicly apologized for the inconvenience caused by the strike and
promised to lower the excessive management fees charged by the taxi
companies, to increase the number of gas stations across the city, and
to crack down on the illegal operation of unregistered taxis. 60 On
November 4, many of the striking taxi drivers went back to work. On
November 5, the management fee charged to drivers was reduced by
50 RMB per day. On the same day, all taxis resumed operation and
the strike came to an end.61
On November 6, Bo Xilai, the party secretary of Chongqing
at the time, promised to take steps to address the problems facing the
taxi industry and presided over a consultation meeting that included
forty taxi driver representatives, twenty residents’ representatives,
five representatives from the taxi companies, and two representatives
from gas stations.62 The three-hour consultation meeting, at which
most of the speakers were taxi drivers, was broadcast live by the
official Xinhua news agency and on Chongqing’s main websites,
radio and television stations.63
The Chongqing taxi strike case differs from the Xiamen PX
and Shanghai magnetic levitation railway case in a few interesting
respects. First, although each of the three cases involved the local
government, a group of affected citizens, and an interested third party
(e.g., the taxi companies), the “third party” was much more actively
engaged in the consultative phase of the Chongqing case. In this
57
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sense, participation in administrative decision-making from outside
the government was more complex and arguably broader.
Second, unlike the residents in Xiamen and Shanghai, the taxi
drivers in Chongqing undertook a full-fledged protest in the form of
a strike. The right to strike is not recognized in China’s constitution
and has no basis in Chinese law. 64 Nonetheless, the Chongqing
government did not clamp down on the strike. Instead, and even
absent the more widespread public dissatisfaction in the other two
cases, the Chongqing government was in some respects more
accommodating than its counterparts in the other two cities. It
communicated swiftly with the stakeholders and the broader public,
adopted a form of public participation in order to re-examine the
regulatory framework of the taxi industry, and ultimately adjusted the
rules in accordance with the opinions expressed during the public
consultation process.65
Third, Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Municipal Commission of
Transport Management considered a proposal which, if adopted,
could have created a new channel for effective public participation in
decision-making: namely, to establish a new association to represent
taxi drivers in Chongqing. Such an association could have reduced
the imbalance of power between employers and employees in terms
of their potential influence on government policy-making.
Chongqing’s Taxi Industrial Association is an organization of
employers, which does not represent the interests of employees.66
Taxi drivers have no similar organization to press for their interests
when the government solicits outside input with regards to decisionmaking. This pattern holds true across sectors throughout China.
Employers in specific industrial sectors have well established
associations, and they also have the comprehensive Association of
Industry and Commerce. For sure, employees are technically
represented by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU),
but it does not provide an effective corporatist arrangement—much
64
Article 29 of the 1975 Constitution and Article 45 of the 1978 Constitution did
recognize the right to strike. However, this right was revoked in the 1982 Constitution. See
1982 Nian Xianfa Weihe Quxiao Le Bagong Ziyou (82 年宪法为何取消了 “罢工自由”)
[Why did 1982 Constitution Revoke the Freedom of Strike], 21CCOM.NET (July 17, 2011),
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/lsjd/lccz/article_2011071739766.html (explaining why
drafters of 1982 Constitution revoked the right to strike).
65
See Author’s last name, supra note 91.
66
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less an independent trade union structure—to represent workers’
interests. The ACFTU system lacks the clear demarcation that is
necessary between the rights and interests of workers versus those of
their employers.67 China’s intra-company labor unions are largely
controlled by employers.
However, the ACFTU rejected Chongqing’s proposal
above.68 This prevented a novel approach that could have resulted in
a “win-win” for the local government and affected citizens (in this
case, taxi drivers) in Chongqing. Such an arrangement could have
reduced the transaction costs for the government in obtaining (and
responding to) meaningful input from the taxi drivers. If the taxi
drivers were allowed to have their own representative organization,
communications between them and the government could be made
much more effective and efficient—in both directions. It would also
make it easier for the local government to manage issues in this sector.
Moreover, such an organization would make it easier for government
decision-makers to avoid the dominance of the more powerful and
organized group (employers); to offer adequate representation for the
relatively weaker group (employees); and thereby to support more
participatory decision-making and achieve more widely acceptable
policy outcomes.
4. Hunan Administrative Procedure Rules
All of the above three case studies illustrate increased public
participation¾but in each case, that was the result of a discrete crisis,
and it depended to a large extent upon the personal qualities of
individual local officials. Undoubtedly, these factors constitute a
67
See ZHANG JING, CORPORATISM 164 (2005) (“[T]he pre-condition of a corporatism
arrangement is the differentiation of interest groups. Corporatism is an integrating program
for the problems of interest group politics. The more essential question is that it is based
upon a series of structures with differentiated rights. Corporatism tends to make adjustments
upon this basis.”).
68
See Quanguo Zonggonghui Bushu Tui jin Chuzuche Qiye Zujian Gonghui Gongzuo
(全国总工会部署推进出租车企业组建工会工作) [All-China Federation of Trade Unions
Arranges the Organization of Trade Union in Taxi Companies], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S
DAILY]
(Nov.
15,
2008),
http://acftu.people.com.cn/GB/8345487.html
[https://perma.cc/DV89-8SN4] (stating that the Federation’s rejection is based upon the
Constitution of Chinese Trade Union, which stipulates that members within the same
enterprise, public service institution, government departments and other social organizations
should be included in a single grass roots level trade union organization).
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fragile foundation for public participation to be institutionalized in
administrative decision making. But in some localities, there have
been promising efforts to accomplish just that.69 A notable step in
this regard was taken by Hunan Province with the Administrative
Procedure Rules (“Hunan APR”) it enacted in October 2008.70
Chapter 3 of the Hunan APR provides that every “major
administrative decision” (zhongda xingzheng juece) 71 must be
formulated through a multi-step process that includes preliminary
investigation, expert review, “notice and comment,” lawfulness
review, and consensus decision-making. 72 Popular input is
anticipated at two of these stages, preliminary investigation before a
plan for decision-making is formulated, and then again after a draft
plan is ready and made public. At the preliminary investigation stage,
the undertaking agency is directed to carry out in-depth research on
the subject matter of the contemplated decision, to collect all
necessary information, and to consult relevant parties for negotiation
and coordination.73
Once the draft plan for a “major administrative decision” is
published, the Hunan APR directs the undertaking agency to “seek
the opinions of the general public,” 74 choosing among several
potential methods that include “convening discussion forums,
holding consultations, [and] listening to opinions in an open
manner.”75 In certain circumstances, e.g., “when the general public
has major differences on the decision-making plan,” a public hearing
69
Among laws, regulations enacted by the State Council, and rules, the Price Law and
the Temporary Method for Public Participation in Environmental Protection stipulates some
procedures for public participation.
70
Hunansheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding [Hunan Province Administrative
Procedure Rules] [hereinafter Hunan APR] (promulgated by No. 222 Order of Hunan
Provincial
Government,
Apr.
17,
2008),
available
at
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-PPHunan_APA_Bilingual.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5EA-4ZAV].
71
According to Article 31 of the Hunan APR, major administrative decisions are those
made by people’s governments at the county level and above concerning matters that involve
the overall economic and social development situation of the region, have extensive social
ramifications, involve a high degree of specialization and are closely linked with the people’s
interests. Specifically, such decisions include major policy measures for economic and
social development, master spatial plans, budgeting, major government investment projects,
major matters about the disposal of state-owned assets, etc.
72
Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 34–43.
73
Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 34.
74
Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 35.
75
Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 37.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

[2018]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

47

should be held.76 As to the scope of public participation, generally,
and the selection of participating representatives, the Hunan APR
indicates that these “should be determined to ensure fair expression
of opinions by those in the general public who would be affected by
the decision-making.” 77 Somewhat analogous to the practice of
“notice and comment” under Section 553 of the U.S. Administrative
Procedure Act,78 the Hunan APR also provides that “the opinions of
the general public and the situation regarding their adoption should
be made public to society.”79
Because meaningful and effective public participation often
depends upon access to information, the Hunan APR emphasizes
open government principles throughout its provisions¾requiring
greater disclosure than even the national Regulations on Open
Government Information.80 Specifically, the Hunan APR requires
not only disclosure of substantive government information, but also
procedural openness, for example the openness of administrative
meetings convened by local governments to address policy issues.81
It was reported that during the first year since the enactment of the
Hunan APR that 125 administrative meetings had been made
public.82 Worth noting is that this is actually broader than the national
government transparency regime first established in 2008 under the
Open Government Information Regulations, which only requires
publication of completed administrative decisions. 83 Information
concerning unfinished administrative procedures has been
76

Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 38.
Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 37.
78
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966).
79
See supra note 103.
80
See generally Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of
Government Information (promulgated by Decree No. 492 of the State Council, Apr. 5, 2007)
(discussing the government information disclosure regulations).
81
See, e.g., Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 130 (“Administrative hearings should be
held in an open manner except when state secrets, commercial secrets that are protected in
accordance with the law, or the privacy of individuals are involved.”).
82
HUNANSHENG XINGZHENG CHENGXU GUIDING YIZHOUNIAN JUECE TINGZHENGHUI
227 CI 湖南省行政程序规定一周年 决策听证会 227 次 [One Year Anniversary of Hunan
APR Public Hearings on Decision-making for 227 Times], REDNET.CN (Sept. 18, 2009,
11:42:25 PM), http://hn.rednet.cn/c/2009/09/18/1827549.htm [https://perma.cc/LMC8B92V].
83
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information
(promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 17, 2007, effective May 1, 2009), available at
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-RegsEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ACL-3JFY].
77
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categorized as undisclosable processual information by the General
Office of State Council since 2010.84
Altogether, the Hunan APR can be regarded as a prototype
administrative procedure law for China, which despite decades of
scholarly efforts remains wanting of its own comprehensive
legislation on administrative procedure. 85 It is the sort of local
government rule that, by accumulating experience, can help to propel
forward future legislation at the national level. Already, it has
influenced other local jurisdictions to adopt similar rules. For
instance, since 2008, 12 localities across China have followed the
footsteps of Hunan to promulgate their own comprehensive rules on
administrative procedures. 86 The impact of Hunan APR upon
subsequent local rules of administrative procedures is notable on a
variety of fronts from basic structure to substantive prescription such
as explicit mentioning of the proportionality principle, which is
originally a German import.87 Additionally, in April 2017, the Office
of Legal Affairs of State Council published a draft version of the
revised Regulations on Procedures of Formulating Administrative
Rules for public comments, which contains very similar provisions
concerning basic requirements of rule-making procedures as the
Hunan APR does. All of this can be seen as the positive repercussion
from the Hunan APR.

84

Available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2013-09/13/content_1472.htm
[https://perma.cc/X37H-XPUJ].
85
Xingzheng Chengxufa Nanchan 25 Nian Beihou: Quanli Buyuan Zifu Shoujiao
行政程序法难产 25 年背后：权力不愿自缚手脚 [Behind the Stillbirth of Administrative
Procedure Act: Power does not want Self-restraints], CHINANEWS.COM (May 14, 2010, 1:56
PM), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2010/05-14/2283088.shtml
[https://perma.cc/UDL4-XJMP]
86
Shengshixian Sanji Yichutai 12 Bu Difang Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding
省市县三级已出台 12 部地方行政程序规定 [Twelve Administrative Procedures Rules
have been Promulgated by Governments at Provincial, Prefectural and County Levels],
XINHUANET.COM (Nov. 26, 2015, 1:31:01 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201511/26/c_128471785.htm [https://perma.cc/8GQ4-ALU3].
87
Zhang Jiansheng, Cong Difang dao Zhongyang: Wo Guo Xingzheng Chengxu Lifa
de Xianshi yu Weilai (从地方到中央: 我国行政程序立法的现实与未来) [From Local to
Central: Realities and Prospects of Administrative Procedures Legislation in China],
STUDY OF ADMIN. L. 54 (2017).
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5. The Participatory Model’s Features and Prospects
In addition to the developments described above in Xiamen,
Shanghai, Chongqing, and Hunan, similar efforts to reform decisionmaking processes have been taking place in many other localities
across China over the last decade or so, including (but not limited to)
“democratic consultation meetings” in Taizhou city of Zhejiang
Province,88 public participation in rule-making in Guangzhou,89 and
the reform of administrative decision-making in Shenzhen.90 These
examples suggest a transition from the traditional, closed “managerial”
decision-making model to a new, more open “participatory” model,
as local government leaders increasingly see the need for such change.
How have local governments been able to promote
participatory governance while the basic structure of the party-state
bureaucracy has not substantially changed? Part of the answer lies in
the growing recognition by central authorities that the style and
method of administrative governance affects whether policies will
succeed. 91 This central-level realization gave local officials
latitude—and incentive—to undertake experiments in administrative
reform. Part of the answer also lies in changes in the policy aims
dictated by the top national leadership. Once the CCP and central
government started promoting the “outlook of scientific development”

88

Chen Tiexiong (陈铁雄), Jiceng Xieshang Minzhu zai Taizhou de Xianxing Tansuo
yu Shijian (基层协商民主在台州的先行探索与实践) [The Pilot Exploration and
Practice of Grass-root Democracy in Taizhou], DANGJIAN.CN, (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.dangjian.cn/djgz/jc/201301/t20130104_1011744.shtml [https://perma.cc/S7S4GL8R].
89
Lian Hongyang (练洪洋), Guangzhou rang Gongzhong Canyu Zhengfu Guizhang
Zhiding Gonggong Juece Minyi Shuo le Suan (广州让公众参与政府规章制定
公共决策民意说了算) [Guangzhou lets the Public to Participate in Government Rule
Formulation—Public Opinions Count in Public Decision-making], PEOPLE.COM (July 20,
2006, 07:44 AM), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/4609116.html
[https://perma.cc/H2AW-6VS5].
90
Zhang Xiaolin (张小玲), Shenzhen Shi Zhongda Xingzheng Juece yao xian Cha
Hefaxing (深圳市重大行政决策要先查合法性) [Major Administrative Decision-making
Must First Check Legality], NANFANG METROPOLIS DAILY (Nov. 10, 2016),
http://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2016-11/10/content_92457.htm#article
[https://perma.cc/YD2A-TAKU].
91
Evidence for this point can be found not only in CCP and central government work
reports, but also in the enactment of the Regulations on Open Government Information,
supra note 80.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/4

50

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 13]

around 2003, 92 the criteria for evaluating cadres’ performance
changed from a one-sided emphasis on economic performance to a
more balanced and diverse set of considerations that include
provision of public services, environment protection, and social
stability.93 Likewise, the process of evaluation came to include wider
use of democratic assessment and opinion polls.94 These changes
mean that local leaders have more reasons to focus on—and compete
in—pursuing participation-enhancing administrative reforms that are
helpful in satisfying the new (not purely economic-growth focused)
criteria.
The cases analyze above reveal the main features of the
emerging, more participatory administrative decision-making model:
1.
The public interest is recognized as the product of
plural and diversified interests that can be expressed by the public
themselves. From Xiamen to Shanghai, for decision-making on
major construction projects, identifying the public interest is now
seen as requiring government bodies to recognize and synthesize
particular citizen interests. Administrative decision-making bodies
shoulder the responsibility of identifying the public interest and
making decisions according to the public interest. Because they are
not able to define the public interest entirely on their own, decisionmaking bodies need to rely on the cooperation and input of the public.
2.
Although the organizational basis of decision-making
is still hierarchical and bureaucratic, reforms over the last decade
92
Scientific Concept of Development and a Harmonious Society, CHINA.ORG (Oct. 8,
2007), http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm [https://perma.cc/6C7LPBZ4].
93
Mao Xiaolin (毛小林), Kexue Fazhanguan yu Guanyuan Nengli Pingjia Tixi
Goujian (科学发展观与官员能力评价体系构建) [Scientific Development and
Constructing the Evaluation System of the Capacity of the Officials], PEOPLE’S TRIB. (Nov.
2009), http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2009-11/11/content_389191.htm
[https://perma.cc/2W2Y-LPY2] (last visited Sep.16, 2017).
94
In July 2006, the Organizational Department of the CCP Central Committee
announced the “Experimental Method to Assess Local Party and Government Leaders
according to the Concept of Scientific Development.” In 2013, the finalized ordinance
about reforming cadre evaluation system was promulgated. See Jiang Tao (蒋涛),
Zhongzubu Chu Kaohe Xingui; Zhongquan Pochu GDP Chongbai (中组部出考核新规 重
拳破除 GDP 崇拜) [COD Initiated New Rules Aiming to Exclude GDP Worship],
CHINANEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2013 07:45 PM), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/1212/5613882.shtml [https://perma.cc/CZH9-HU6D] (making major adjustments to cadre
assessment indicators and procedures, which directly impact officials’ conceptions of
political achievement and focus attention on the party and government’s responsiveness to
local citizens).
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have made this structure more open to public input and participation.
Aforementioned reforms that added public service, environmental
protection and social stability to the list of policy targets and cadre
evaluation criteria, and introduced procedural techniques such as
democratic assessment and opinion polls in cadre evaluation have
given local administrative decision-making bodies more incentives to
respond actively to the demands and opinions of the public.
Additional reforms—such as the extension to higher levels of the
competitive electoral system that already applies to village selfgovernance¾would provide even greater impetus for local officials
to be responsive to the public.
3.
In terms of agenda-setting in daily governance, party
and government agencies share power, to some degree, with the
public. Both the Shanghai and Xiamen cases documented above
demonstrate that the public now enjoys increased opportunities to
influence government agenda-setting through procedures adopted by
the government or through expressing public opinion in the media
and on the internet.
4.
Since the 2008 OGI Regulations, administrative
transparency has become more institutionalized, giving the public
more reliable access to the information needed in order to formulate
opinions and participate in shaping administrative decisions.
Administrative agencies are required to respect and uphold the
public’s right to know. Many members of the public now actively
provide decision-making bodies with information about their
interests, and decision-makers pay more attention to information
provided by the public when making decisions, as evidenced by the
participation of large number of citizens in both the Xiamen and
Shanghai protests.
5.
Decision-making bodies have come to adopt multiple
channels for the representation and expression of public interest
beyond the few, highly constrained ones that characterized the
managerial model of decision-making. These new channels include
consultation meetings, deliberation meetings and public hearings, all
of which were present in the cases discussed above.
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III. PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
We have set forth the key features of China’s emerging
participatory mode of governance. In this section, we offer
arguments about why the participatory governance model is more
normatively attractive than the managerial governance model, and
why it is appropriate for contemporary Chinese society.
1. Participatory Governance: A Normative Assessment
The participatory model can surpass the managerial model in
enhancing government legitimacy. It can do so because the
participatory model regards citizens as stake-holders (or cooperative
partners) who influence the process of governance, not as mere
subjects of governance who occasionally provide information to
bureaucrats (who set targets, make policy choices, and implement
policy).
This emerging model, in China, is broadly consistent with the
PRC Constitution’s principle of popular sovereignty, which is
reflected in the constitutional provision that the National People’s
Congress¾the organ of popular sovereignty¾is the supreme organ
of state power.95 The legislature expresses the will of the people,
while the authority of the executive derives from that of the
legislature.96 When the government faithfully obeys the will of the
legislature, the democratic legitimacy of the legislature can be

95
XIANFA art. 2 (1982) (China). Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution declares that “All
power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people. The National People’s
Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are the organs through which
the people exercise state power.” This provision is generally held as defining the “popular
sovereignty” principle of the Chinese Constitution, i.e., all state power ultimately derives
from “the people,” who exercise such power through the national and local people’s
congresses. See Zhang Qianfan, From Popular Sovereignty to Human Rights: On the
Paradigm Transformation of Chinese Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1 ASIA L.Q. 1, 1–20
(2009),
http://www.klri.re.kr/uploadfile/AK21/ALQ_200901_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KKV-WY4S] (showing the power dynamic set forth in the Constitution
of the People’s Republic of China). Thus, the legislature holds primary authority.
Administrative and judicial powers derive from the legislative power and are under
legislative supervision. See XIANFA art. 57 (1982) (stating “[t]he National People’s Congress
of the People’s Republic of China is the highest organ of state power.”).
96
Id.
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transmitted to the executive’s policy decisions. 97 Judicial review
plays an auxiliary role, ensuring that when the government’s
sanctions affect citizens, those actions remain within the bounds set
by the legislature. The prominent American administrative law
professor Richard Stewart once called this the “transmission belt”
model of legitimate administrative action.98 In this model, the state’s
executive organs play the role that Weber conceived for bureaucrats:
a relatively mechanical function that takes orders from the legislature
and executes those orders.99
The “transmission belt” model has certain shortcomings,
however, from the perspective of a participatory model of governance.
Under the “transmission belt” model, public participation in
administrative decision-making is only indirect¾limited to the
selection of legislative representatives, and to whatever forms of
public participation are available in the legislative process. Moreover,
with the legislature constrained in its capacity to regulate an
increasingly complex society, more and more power is delegated to
the executive, expanding bureaucratic jurisdiction and discretion.
Since bureaucrats inevitably have their own interests and preferences,
and do not necessarily follow the will of the legislature,100 constraint
over the executive thus become less stringent than the “transmission
belt” idea might suggest. Given the ease with which government can
satisfy the requirements of formal legality without taking public
interests and preferences into account, formal legality therefore looks
increasingly ineffective in securing substantive legitimacy for
administrative decisions.101
Expertise might offer a separate basis for legitimating
administrative decision-making that is “participatory” in the limited
97
Wang Xixin (王锡锌) & Zhang Yongle, (章永乐), Zhuanjia, Dazhong yu Zhishi de
Yunyong (专家、大众与知识的运用) [The Public, Experts and the Use of Knowledge] 24
SOC. SCI. IN CHINA 113 (2003).
98
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1675 (1975).
99
Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 232-35 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
100
See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 4–5, 79 (1967) (describing
the internal and external motivations for bureaucrats).
101
See Stewart, supra note 98, at 1684 (discussing the failure of both “transmission belt”
theory and traditional “expertise” model to legitimate agency action when the agencies are
only considered to “adjust competing private interests” without taking the public into
account).
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sense that it requires input from actors outside of party-state organs.
Expertise is legitimating because experts are professionally trained,
with rigorous disciplinary qualifications, and thus can be assumed to
make decisions that are substantively rational and politically
neutral. 102 During the New Deal period in the United States, the
Roosevelt administration used this justification to expand
administrative power.103
Rooting government legitimacy in professional expertise is
inferior, however, in several respects, to a more fully participatory
approach. Experts can be very good at finding the best means to
achieve pre-determined ends¾but they are not especially capable of
choosing among different or even conflicting ends. Choices among
ends often entail choices among values, which are political choices.
Secondly, experts are inevitably subject to the limitations of their
disciplines. Their views of complex problems can be partial and
parochial. When experts from different fields are brought together to
address a policy problem, the process does not necessarily lead to an
optimal policy outcome. There may well be irreconcilable conflict
between their perspectives. Finally, the professionalism of the
experts does not guarantee rational application of their expertise to
promote general welfare. When there is room for substantial
discretion (as there often is in policy making), “governance by
experts” may satisfy the requirements of formal legality while
favoring special interest groups.104
Moreover, the advent of the information age has undermined
the advantages and legitimacy of relying on experts in policy-making.
Experts’ monopoly on knowledge and information has been
broken.105 Equipped with new technology, many more people can
collect information—and even develop their own skills and
expertise¾to make independent judgments on policy matters, with
less deference to the authority of experts. This pattern is quite evident
in China. For example, in the Xiamen and Shanghai cases discussed
above, the public challenged environmental experts’ supposedly
“scientific conclusions.” 106 Even though environmental protection
standards and impact assessments involve highly technical matters,
102
103
104
105
106

Wang & Zhang, supra note 3.
Stewart, supra note 98, at 1684.
See Wang & Zhang, supra note 3 (analyzing from an epistemological perspective).
Id.
Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

[2018]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

55

which may not be fully understood by ordinary citizens, the residents
in Xiamen and Shanghai had information that empowered them to be
more critical. They were able to compare China’s national standards
with those used in developed countries and see the notable gap
between them. This became the basis on which the citizens
challenged the experts’ conclusions and authority. This phenomenon
was unimaginable before the advent of the information age.
The more direct public participation in governance that is
emerging in China can address the deficiencies of both the
“transmission belt” and “expertise” paradigms canvassed above, and
better enhance the legitimacy of administrative governance. Such
public participation can make up for the weakness of legislative
control over the executive, and hence make the practice of the
government more truly representative of the public interest. (At the
same time, by giving the public a more direct role to play in decisionmaking, it can enhance public acceptance of government policies as
well.) Greater public participation can also introduce additional
information and analysis into decision-making to complement—and
constrain—experts’ input, enhancing policy rationality. In official
Chinese terminology, these legitimacy and rationality-enhancing
functions of public participation represent “the democratization and
scientification” of government decision-making.107
Actually, greater public participation in the processes of
administrative governance has been a global trend since the 1980s.108
Throughout the world, there has been ever more emphasis on the
recognition and protection of the people’s “right to know” and their
right to participate in administrative decision-making. 109 Global
trends, however, cannot simply be assumed to offer models that are
well suited for contemporary China. Different countries at different
stages of development pose very different conditions, and attempts at
107

Wang & Zhang, supra note 97.
See, e.g., 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in
Government (June 26–9, 2007), Vienna, Austria, Public Administration and Democratic
Governance: Governments Serving Citizens (Jan. 2007) (highlighting the role of the public
in governance).
109
For a historical account of this phenomenon, see Michael Schudson, THE RISE OF THE
RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY, 1945-1975 (Harvard Univ.
Press, 2015) (providing a historical outlook of how the “right to know” rose in popular
political culture). For an evaluation of the global growth of government transparency
legislation, see John M. Ackerman and Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion
of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. LAW REVIEW, 85–130 (2006) (analyzing the
political culture that favors transparency).
108
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“legal transplant” can fail for many reasons. The key question, then,
is whether participatory governance may be appropriate for China
and its society today?
2. Does Participatory Governance Suit China?
The case studies presented in Part II of this article illustrate
an almost simultaneous emergence of participatory governance in
many places across China that was not the direct result of intentional
design or political campaigns initiated from the central government.
Rather, participatory governance has emerged both from local
governments responding to local crises and from local leaders’
ambition to be at the forefront of political and administrative reform
in China. These dynamics provide evidence that participatory
governance is rooted in China’s current social context, can work in
China, and ought not be dismissed as a passing fad. This assessment
has far-reaching implications for China’s future governance.
Why is this emerging model suitable to contemporary
Chinese society?
First, participatory governance has clear
instrumental utility.
As discussed earlier, broader public
participation can make policy decisions easier to implement because
they are more likely to be acceptable to the public. Opportunities for
the public to participate in decision-making also can serve as a safety
valve to relieve mounting social tension and dissatisfaction in China
today.
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has
entered a period of increased social unrest. The number of “mass
incidents” has increased significantly, from 8700 in 1993, to more
than 90,000 in 2006.110 The increase in mass incidents is not the
result of economic stagnation or recession, but rather the consequence
of the imbalances that have accompanied the rapid economic growth
that China has achieved so far.111 For a variety of reasons, many
ordinary people’s grievances often have not been addressed properly
by local governments, giving rise to increased social tension and
instability.
110

See “Liao Wang” Wenzhang: Qunti Xingshi Jiantui Dong Fansi (“瞭望” 文章: 群
体性事件推动反思) [Collective Turbulences Push Forward Reflection], LIAOWANG (Dec.
22, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-12/22/content_10541258.htm (describing
the social unrest in the twenty-first century).
111
Murray Scot Tanner, China Rethinks Unrest, 27 WASH. Q. 137 (2004).
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In recent years, central authorities have taken new steps to
address mass incidents, including the development of a public
emergency management system in the form of the 2007 Law on
Emergency Response and a program at the central Party School to
train county party secretaries on how to respond to public
emergencies.112 While all of this focuses on ex post facto diffusion
of the conflict, participatory governance offers a more fundamental
and proactive approach to the problem. In principle, it provides
marginalized social groups with channels to participate in and
influence government decisions and policies, which will then help
lessen the prospects for social unrest.
Second, participatory governance is suited to increasing
urbanization in China. According to official statistics, urban areas
are now home to more than half of China’s people, and China’s
urbanization rate may reach 65% by 2030.113 Urban areas feature
higher levels of social diversification and pluralization, higher levels
of education, greater access to information technology, and, in turn,
greater capacity among citizens to take action to influence
government decision-making. In addition, the population density of
urban areas means that citizens’ collective action usually can have a
more significant and widespread impact on society.
Local
governments in such areas consequently face more severe challenges
if they adopt poorly designed policies that have not benefited from
public input or secured public acceptance.
Ongoing rapid
urbanization therefore is likely to accelerate the expansion of
participatory governance in China, including as a means to relieve
social grievances resulting from rapid urbanization itself.

112

See JACQUES DELISLE, EMERGENCY POWERS LAW IN ASIA 342 (Victor V. Ramraj &
Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010) (describing the emergency response law); Zhongyang
Dangxiao dui Xianwei Shuji Lunxun Guanzhu Tufaxing Shijian Chuli Deng (中央党校对县
委书记轮训关注突发性事件处理等) [Party School of the CCP Central Committee Trains
County Party Secretaries in Rotation with a Focus on How to Deal with Emergencies],
CHINANEWS.COM (Nov. 15, 2008), http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/1115/1450314.shtml [https://perma.cc/AN6Z-5ENQ] (explaining the governmentimplemented emergency response protocols).
113
See CHINA ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2008 Nian Zhongguo Chengshi
Jingzhengli Lanpishu: Zhongguo Chengshi Jingzhengli Baogao (2008 年中国城市竞争力
蓝皮书: 中国城市竞争力报告) [A Blue Book on the Competitiveness of Chinese Cities in
2008: China Cities Competitiveness Report] (2008).
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At the same time, conditions favoring participatory
governance are emerging even in China’s rural areas. 114 Many
villages are no longer purely agricultural societies, but instead are
under the ubiquitous economic and cultural influence of urban areas.
As China’s rural economy and society change accordingly, the
information needed for policy-making becomes more complicated
and the managerial mode of governance less adequate. Furthermore,
some changes in rural China are reducing the previously high cost of
citizens’ collective action. For example, the penetration rate of
computers and internet in the countryside grew at more than a 60%
annual rate¾albeit from a low baseline of a mere 52.7 million—from
2007 to 2008.115 As the difference in life circumstances between
people living in urban and rural China shrinks, their previously
different modes of governance are likely to converge toward the
participatory governance model.
Third,
participatory
governance
offers
important
psychological and cultural benefits to Chinese citizens. The practice
of self-governance, especially the experiences of collective
communication and deliberation, can reduce the psychological
alienation felt by many citizens under the managerial model and can
enhance social trust and social solidarity.
The problem and danger of alienation in Chinese society is
reflected in the worrying phenomenon described by the Chinese
sociologist Yu Jianrong as “mass incidents without actual interests
114
It should be noted that competitive elections were introduced in China’s rural areas
earlier than in urban areas. See Kevin J. O’Brien, Understanding China’s Grassroots
Elections
(Aug.
22,
2009),
http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3854/OBrien-Introduction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EA7V-6YZ3] (noting that rural areas in China had competitive elections
before urban areas had competitive elections). However, the existence of village elections
does not mean that the governing mechanism in rural areas changed substantially. In most
places, villagers have nothing to do with public affairs after casting their votes. Villages
with successful participatory governance are hard to find. See Tong Zhihui, Cunmin Zizhi
Sanshinian (村民自治三十年) [Three Decades of Village Self-Governance], STUDY TIMES
(April
7,
2008),
http://www.sociologyol.org/yanjiubankuai/fenleisuoyin/fenzhishehuixue/nongcunshehuixu
e/2008-04-16/5158.html [https://perma.cc/ME3M-XEC6] (highlighting lack of participation
from villagers in rural areas).
115
The 23rd Statistical Report of Internet Development in China, CHINA INTERNET
NETWORK
INFORMATION
CENTER
(Jan.
22,
2009),
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/research/bgxz/tjbg/200906/t20090615_18388.html
[https://perma.cc/KF26-6VAC].
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involved.”116 Those who participate in this kind of incident often do
not have a particularized interest at stake. They merely express
general discontent. If such discontent cannot be handled effectively
by established social channels and political institutions, it can lead to
ever greater social antagonism and, ultimately, explosions of unrest.
Xiamen’s PX case provides a good example of how the
participatory model of governance can help to address such problems
of alienation. Xiamen residents banded together to pursue a specific
goal in which they had a direct stake: protecting the environment of
their city. During this process, many residents felt that they united
into a community that shared the same destiny. The process produced
a sense of self-fulfillment and solidarity. Participation was a form of
social therapy. To be sure, the Xiamen PX case and other incidents
that have spurred the development of participatory governance at
local levels also involve tension and even confrontation among
participants. Social groups with different interests may well hold
conflicting opinions. But orderly public participation offer a
preferable means for addressing such conflicts—one that is much
better than trying to cover up differences and letting them fester.
Finally, China’s emerging model of participatory governance
offers a promising and reliable pathway to carrying out China’s
broader agenda of political and administrative reform in an orderly
way. The goal of broadening citizens’ participation in politics was
officially endorsed at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Left open was
the question of the means to achieve that goal. The participatory
model of governance that is emerging in China is, in its nature, a
project of “orderly participation” that promises to avoid the social
turbulence that has often accompanied democratization in developing
countries. China’s model of participatory governance adopts a path
of incremental reform, using existing political and administrative
organizations as the basic platform on which to widen citizens’
participation. In this process, pragmatic considerations often drive
adjustments of the basic political structure. In its operation,
participatory governance is highly flexible, and can reflect the
116

Yu Jianrong, Shehuixiefengshijian Zhong Quntixinliyanjiu: Dui “Wen’anshijian”
Fashengjizhi De Yizhongjieshi (社会泄愤事件中群体心理研究—对 “瓮安事件” 发生
机制的一种解释) [Study on the Collective Psyche in Social Anger-Venting Incidents: An
Explanation of the Originating Mechanism of Wen’an Incident] SOCIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE,
Feb. 28, 2009, http://www.sociologyol.org/yanjiubankuai/xuejierenwu/yujian/2009-0228/7376.html [https://perma.cc/5BWV-LMVQ].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/4

60

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 13]

demands of different situations in different localities. Moreover,
participation can be promoted alongside the rationalization of
administrative organization. In principle, this process of reform can
utilize as fully as possible the knowledge and expertise of
administrative officials, while at the same time opening decisionmaking processes to the wisdom of the people.
In sum, the most compelling argument for participatory
governance in China is not just that it follows some global trend or
standard, but rather that it well suits China’s particular conditions and
can help resolve China-specific problems.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENTS OF PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE
We now turn to the basic institutional framework for a
participatory model of governance to be more fully realized in China.
These components include core institutional infrastructure,
supporting institutions and procedural techniques.
In terms of the core institutional infrastructure, two elements
are particularly crucial: (i) a system of open government information
and (ii) collective representation of interests. The first, open
government information, is based upon the simple idea that
information is the basis for decision-making. So, if members of the
public know little or nothing about the operation of the government,
they cannot adequately supervise the government or make any
meaningful criticisms or suggestions concerning government
policy.117 Sharing of information is the first step toward sharing of
decision-making power. Because bureaucracies’ default position is
often to withhold information, many countries have enacted
legislation to impose duties to disclose information on the
government. In China, national OGI Regulations enacted in 2008
impose such duties and specify the categories of information that the
government must make public.118 While the OGI Regulations does
not
establish
explicitly
the
principle
that
117

See generally THE RIGHT TO KNOW: TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD (Ann
Florini ed., 2007) (addressing what information governments and other powerful
organizations should disclose); JAMIE P. HORSLEY, TOWARD A MORE OPEN CHINA (2005),
http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/Toward_an_Open_China_Horsley.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GW2-UNN3] (discussing the development of government transparency
in China, “as well as the prospects for China’s further opening”).
118
See [Author name], supra note 111, art. 19.
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“disclosure is the rule and non-disclosure is the exception,” nor does
it prohibit local governments from promulgating open government
rules that require disclosure of an even wider range of information
than mandated at the national level (unless other laws require that the
information be kept secret).
Second, collective representation of interests is crucial to
participatory governance because the transaction costs of negotiating
with unorganized individuals in an area with a large population
(which is often the case even at very local levels in China) are
impossibly high. Efficient decision-making requires that individuals
with common interests band together so that their interests can be
expressed and represented collectively by associations. With these
channels of representation and expression, administrative agencies
are more likely to be assured that the information they receive is
reliable and the policies they make are accordingly more likely to be
accepted by the members of the affected public, including those who
do not directly participate in the decision-making process.
Of course, for collective representation to work most
effectively, China will need to gradually relax the limitations that
have previously been placed on people’s right to associate, so that
interest groups can establish organizations capable of expressing their
views and interests. 119 To ensure robust collective representation,
attention must be paid to mechanisms for empowering weaker and
more diffuse groups of interested parties. This is necessary to avoid
disproportionate influence by stronger social groups with higher
levels of organization and, in extreme cases “regulatory capture.”120
Decision-making bodies therefore should take measures to empower
disadvantaged social groups by reducing the costs of organizing
collective action and to assure their ability to express their interests
and make their voices heard in policy-making processes.
Beyond these two core institutions, effective participatory
governance in China also depends on several additional supporting
institutions, which still need further reforms to be truly
complementary.

119

See generally QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS (2012) (addressing the still dormant political and religious rights in China).
120
On regulatory capture, see generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The
Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON.
1089 (1991) (discussing an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics).
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1. Legislative supervision of administration
In China, it is both necessary and possible to promote
participatory
governance
and
legislative
empowerment
simultaneously. The latter can support the former. At the same time,
embrace of participatory governance could strengthen legislative
capacity to control and supervise government administration, as well.
In performing oversight functions, for example, over government
budgets that are technically mandated under Chinese law but not fully
realized as of yet, legislative supervision would serve as a (less direct)
form of public participation, by raising opinions that the public shares
or protecting interests that the public would assert.121
2. Courts and judicial review
Administrative litigation is another important support
institution for meaningful public participation in governance.
Lawsuits to challenge administrative actions are especially
significant for members of the public who are under-represented in
administrative decision-making processes. The effectiveness of
administrative litigation is limited in China, however, because until
2015, courts were authorized to review only “specific” administrative
acts, not the underlying rules that might be the basis for such acts.
Since the 2015 revision to the Administrative Litigation Law,
Chinese courts are now allowed to review the underlying rules. Yet
it remains to be seen whether the updated judicial review system can
help the public to challenge effectively government decisions of a
more generalized nature.
3. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(“CPPCC”)
Designed to represent diverse social groups, the CPPCC—
and lower-level political consultative conferences—can also play, at
least in theory, a significant supportive role in the process of
participatory governance. Through their proposals at conference
121

For a critical assessment of the lack of representation in China’s local congresses,
see MELANIE MANION, INFORMATION FOR AUTOCRATS: REPRESENTATION IN CHINESE LOCAL
CONGRESSES (2015) (forming an opinion on the lack of public representation in local
government).
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sessions, conference members can set agendas for administrative
decision-making through their rights to “participate in and deliberate
on public affairs.” 122 Then, during the process of administrative
decision-making, political consultative conference members can also
represent the policy preferences of members of the public to
government decision-makers.
4. Think tanks and expert consultation
In the process of participatory governance, decision-making
bodies and the public need input from experts on many technical
matters that arise in the context of administrative decision-making.
The development of think tanks and expert consultation systems
therefore can contribute to the improvement of participatory
governance.
5. Mass media and the dissemination of views and information
Mass media can perform several vital roles in supporting
participatory governance. The media can publish government
information and report public opinion. Both the public and
administrative bodies may engage in agenda-setting, discussion of
issues, or even policy debates through the media. Media coverage
also provides an important platform for policy feedback and
supervision after decisions are made.

V. TECHNIQUES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING
Furthermore, a participatory model of governance entails
several procedural techniques for administrative decision-making.
From our perspective, the following are the most fundamental:
1. Specifying the Scope of Public Participation
Although a significant role for public participation in
government decision-making is central to the participatory model of
governance, it would be impossible to have public participation in
122
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE
CONFERENCE, THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE CHARTER
(1982), http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/2011/09/14/ARTI1315980170869872.shtml
[https://perma.cc/Q8PW-S7TB].
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every instance. Decision-making inevitably operates within limits
imposed by technology, fiscal pressure, available time, and other
constraints on resources. As John Clayton Thomas argues,
sometimes the substantive policy choice is clear, the government
already has adequate information without public participation, and
public acceptance is not crucial for policy implementation. 123 In
these cases, administrative agencies can make decision without
public input.124 But such situations are rare. On most issues, public
participation is vital or at least helpful.
In the absence of national administrative procedure legislation
in China, provisions governing the scope of public participation are
scattered across many statutes, regulations, and local rules.125 Some
of these provisions notably support widened public participation. For
example, Article 35 of the Hunan APR stipulates that, except for
matters that other laws provide shall not be made public, decisionmaking bodies must publish a draft of “major administrative
decision-making” plans and solicit opinions from the general public
for a period of not less than twenty days.126 Furthermore, Article 38
123

See John Clayton Thomas, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISIONS: NEW SKILLS
STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 8 (1995) (opining that the public is not always
needed to make decisions in the government, particularly when all the relevant information
is available to the government but may not be available to the public).
124
Id.
125
See, e.g., Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Gong Zhong Canyu Zanxing Banfa (环境影
响评价公众参与暂行办法) [Provisional Ordinance Concerning Public Participation in the
Evaluation of Environmental Influence] (promulgated by National Environmental Protection
Bureau, February 14, 2006, effective March 18, 2006) (providing the example of the use of
the public in decisions regarding environmental issues); Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli
( 规 章 制 定 程 序 条 例 ) [Ordinance Concerning the Procedures for the Formulation of
Administrative Rules] (promulgated by the St. Council, November 16, 2001, effective
January 1, 2002), art. 15 (providing the example of the use of the public in decisions
regarding administrative rules); Xing Zheng Fa Gui Zhi Ding Chengxu Tiaoli (行政法规制
定程序条例) [Ordinance Concerning the Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative
Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council, November 16, 2001, effective January 1,
2002), art. 12, 19, 22 (providing the example of the use of the public in decisions regarding
administrative regulation issues); Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 58,
2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 112 (providing the example of the use
of the public in decisions regarding legislative issues); Jiage Fa (价格法) [Price Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., December 29, 1997, effective
May 1, 1998), art. 23, 1998 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (providing the
example of the use of the public in decisions regarding pricing issues).
126
See Hunansheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding (湖南省行政程序规定) [Hunan
Province Administrative Procedure Rules (promulgated by No. 222 Order of Hunan
AND
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requires a hearing before major administrative decision-making
under any of the following circumstances: (i) a decision involves an
important interest of the general public; (ii) there are notably
differences in views among the general public toward the policy
proposed; (iii) the policy decision might affect social stability; or (iv)
laws, regulations or rules stipulate that a hearing be held.
2. Sharing Agenda-Setting Power
The power to set agendas is often more important than the
right to participate in discussions. Framing the agenda determines to
a large extent the scope and depth of deliberation. Influence at this
stage enables citizens to play an initiating role in administrative
decision-making, and not simply serve as the passive objects of
governance. Therefore, when outlining procedures for public
participation, it is necessary to prescribe that the public has the right
to propose issues to be decided. Article 2 of Hangzhou’s Provisions
on Open Decision-Making Procedures provides a good example of
just such a rule. It states that “citizens, legal persons and other
organizations can submit their proposals to be deliberated and
decided on to the Office of People’s Opinions, and these proposals
should be forwarded to the General Office of the municipal
government.”127
Public participation in the agenda-setting phase can, and
should, extend to proposing draft plans, especially in contexts where
the decision-making process includes public hearings. The Price Law
provides good examples of this necessity. Article 23 of the law
requires that hearings be held for decisions that involve major price
adjustments.128 And many hearings have been held in many places,
generating some enthusiasm among the public. Nonetheless, many
people have found such hearings to be disappointing, in that they are
Provincial Government, Apr. 17, 2008), art. 31 (defining “major administrative decisionmaking” as involving issues that are closely related to the overall economic and social
development at the local level, have significant social implications, require professional
expertise, are closely related to the people’s welfare, or need high acceptance from the
public).
127
Available at http://www.hangzhoufz.gov.cn/details/gfwjdetail.aspx?id=1440.
128
Jiage Fa (价格法) [Price Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., December 29, 1997, effective May 1, 1998), art. 23, 1998 STANDING COMM. NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.
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employed to justify raising prices. Despite many objections voiced
by participants, it seems that almost every hearing held under the
Price Law has led to an approval of price increases.129 This outcome
partly reflects the weakness of public participation in agenda-setting:
administrative bodies usually have a well-structured proposal in place
well before they disclose any draft plan. The agenda is already fixed
before any public hearing is held. Administrative bodies often use
hearings to improve the acceptability of price increases that the body
already plans to approve. Accordingly, criticism about “show
hearings” have frequently captured media headlines.130 To make the
hearing process more meaningful as a process for public participation,
a crucial step is to recognize a place for the public in agenda-setting
and to allow members of the public to raise their own policy plans.
Of course, recognition of rights is not the same thing as
generating capacity to utilize those rights. Even the best formal
procedures cannot guarantee that public participation will be
effective. How much agenda-setting power the public can exercise
meaningfully upon the people’s capacity to make systematic, feasible,
and convincing proposals. This in turn depends upon development
of institutions such as the media, associations, and other mechanisms
for collective representation of interests, as well as a pool of experts
outside the party-state and its think tanks who are willing and able to
address policy issues.
3. Channels for Public Participation
Several procedural techniques can provide channels for fair
and effective public participation in administrative decision-making,
including: notice and comment, discussion meetings, consultation
meetings, public hearings, and “listening to opinions in an open
manner.” For important policy issues involving the public interest,
notice and comment should be the required procedure. Other
procedural techniques can be added where they are appropriate and
helpful in fostering public participation, and their requirements
129

Jiage Tingzhenghui Jue Da Duoshu Shi Zhangjia: Tingzhenghui Zhishi Zuoxiu
(价格听证会绝大多数是涨价: 听证会只是作秀?) [Most Price Hearings for Increasing
the Price: Are Those Hearings Just for Show?], TENCENT FINANCE (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://finance.qq.com/a/20100108/001844.htm [https://perma.cc/43F4-HWM3].
130
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should be clearly defined. The choice among procedures can be
guided by the principle of equal and fair expression of interests，
which means that both individualized and organized interests should
be allowed to voice.131 Administrative bodies should make sure that
interest representation is balanced and no interested party is excluded
from the procedure. What this requires will differ, depending on
whether there is strong collective representation, partially collective
representation, or non-collective representation. Important interested
parties should have their own representatives in the decision-making
process. And this may require special efforts to ensure that an
interested party with a low level of organization is not excluded from
the procedure. Other procedures may be necessary when there are
major disagreements among the public. In this situation, fair
representation of parties with different opinions is especially
important. When policy implementation demands high acceptance
from the public, administrative agencies should adopt procedures to
facilitate compromises among stakeholders and affected parties with
conflicting views.
Although particular procedures may be better-suited to
various circumstances, every procedural technique has its own
weaknesses. Notice and comment procedures, for example, may fail
to reach sufficiently wide public audiences due to time limitations
and thereby unduly constrain the public’s access to information and
opportunity for participation. As noted above, in the Shanghai
magnetic levitation railway case, notices were posted on two
government websites but not in the residential communities along the
proposed railway line. This made it difficult for busy residents or
residents without internet access to learn about the proposed decision
131

See Hunan Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding (湖南行政程序规定) [Hunan Province
Administrative Procedure Provisions], art. 37 (promulgated by Hunan Province People’s
Government, April 17, 2008, effective October 1, 2008) (providing that “the scope of
participation by the general public and the selection of participating representatives should
be determined to ensure fair expression of opinions by those in the general public who would
be affected by the decision-making”); Hangzhou Shi Renmin Zhengfu Zhongda Xingzheng
Shixiang Shishi Kaifangshi Juece Chengxu Guiding (杭州市人民政府重大行政事项实施
开放式决策程序规定) [The Provisions of Hangzhou Municipal People’s Government
Concerning Open Decision-Making Procedures], art. 7 (promulgated by Hangzhou
Municipal People’s Government, Jan. 13, 2009, effective Jan. 13, 2009) (stating that the
procedure is more elaborate and that “when consulting the opinions of trade associations,
intermediaries, interested parties, mass organizations and the public by discussion forums,
hearings, negotiation forums, interested parties, especially the defected, unemployed, and
new immigrants should receive fair expression of opinions.”).
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and to get access to necessary information. For those who have no
access to internet, alternative channels for information and
participation must be made available if they are to have fair and equal
opportunities in express their views and have their interests
represented in administrative decision-making.
In government decision-making processes in China today,
consultation meetings and negotiation meetings are more and more
widely used. In the Xiamen, Shanghai and Chongqing cases analyzed
above, consultation meetings rather than public hearings were used.
Compared with public hearings, consultation meetings and
negotiation meetings are more flexible. Although this flexibility has
advantages in terms of cost and adaptability to the circumstances of
a particular policy decision, it can also hinder public participation.
Compared to public hearings and other more formal techniques,
consultation and negotiation meetings impose fewer procedural
constraints on the decision-making bodies. They can communicate
with interested parties separately, rather than all of them collectively.
They do not need to include all interested parties, announce meetings
publicly beforehand, or provide written records afterwards. More
flexible, less formal approaches can make resulting decision less
credible or less acceptable to the public, especially groups that have
not been fully and equally included in the process. Where important
decisions concerning the public interest are being made, formal
public hearings are necessary to provide for adequate public
participation.
5. Legal Consequences of Public Participation
If public participation is to have meaningful impact on
administrative decision-making, decision-making bodies must bear a
legal duty to respond to public input. The most fundamental
safeguard here is a legal duty to give reasons: decision-making
authorities must be required to provide an account of the basis on
which the policy is made, including especially the reasons some
public opinions were accepted and others were not. Article 37 of the
Hunan APR offers a notable version of the type of requirement that
should apply where the procedural technique is consultation meetings
where the “responsible department should classify the opinions and
suggestions submitted by the general public on the major
administrative decision-making and adopt those reasonable
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suggestions. For those opinions that are not adopted, reasons should
be provided.”132
Where more formal procedural techniques such as public
hearings are employed, administrative authorities should be under
more stringent legal obligations. Article 139 of the Hunan APR
offers an example of the requirements that should apply in these
contexts. Written records of a hearing shall be made to faithfully
record the views and reasons presented by the speakers. Audio and
video recordings may also be made. The written records of a hearing
should be signed or stamped by the participants after being checked
and confirmed.
Administrative authorities should take
comprehensive consideration of all opinions presented by the
participants and adopt those that are reasonable. Adoption or
rejection of suggestions made by the participants should be made
public. Reasons for not adopting suggestions made at a hearing
should be provided. 133 Although the Hunan Rules commendably
impose on decision-making authorities a duty to give reasons for
accepting or rejecting public input in its Article 37, additional
procedural safeguards should be required in cases where public
hearings are the technique adopted for public input. We suggest that
the sole permissible basis for making decisions after a public hearing
should be what is recorded in the minutes of the hearing.
6. Policy Feedback and Error-Correction Mechanism
Finally, a public participation model of governance requires
effective mechanisms for policy feedback and error-correction.
Decision-making is not a one-off event and it does not end with the
announcement of a decision. Many decisions need modification after
their adoption or initial implementation. Policy feedback is a
significant stage in the decision-making process, and in some cases
can trigger a new round of decision-making processes. After the
announcement of a decision, policy-makers should continue to take
into account opinions from the public. This requires decision-making
authorities in China to revise the mentality of the old, managerial
132

Hunansheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding [Hunan Province Administrative
Procedure Rules], art. 37 (promulgated by No. 222 Order of Hunan Provincial
Government, Apr. 17, 2008).
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model. It is well known that China has taken an innovative
experimental approach to reform and development for decades,
which has to date been met with considerable success. 134 Yet ex post
facto evaluation and modification of government decisions is as
important as ex ante experimentation leading up to decisions. They
should not regard administrative litigation, administrative review or
critical reporting in the media as burdensome or as something to be
resisted. Rather, they should regard administrative litigation and
review and media coverage as mechanisms for useful policy feedback.
Accordingly, government should avoid interfering with the freedom
of the press to criticize public policies, specifically during the phase
of policy implementation.

VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have argued that a new model of
participatory governance is emerging as a trend of administrative
reform in China. The decision-making process of government organs,
particularly at the local level, is increasingly open and public
participation in administrative process is widening and deepening.
Through case studies of recent developments in several localities, we
have shown how administrative innovation toward a more
participatory model has been taking place. On that basis, we have
identified and discussed the essential components and main features
of the emerging model of participatory governance.
China’s move to a participatory model follows a global trend
towards more public participation in governance. However, we argue
that the emergence of the participatory model in China is attributed
more to its indigenous roots and the fact that it offers a better solution
to many of China’s problems. Greater public participation can help
avoid imbalances in policy-making, resolve social tensions, and
improve the quality of administrative decisions. Through regular
participation in policy decision-making, the public’s capacity to take
political action can improve. In this way, the participatory model also
serves as a form of civic education. The participatory model can help
relieve the sense of alienation that has become a problem in the
Chinese society, and enhance social trust and solidarity. As a
134

Sebastian Heilmann, From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of
China’s Distinctive Policy Process, 59 CHINA J. 1, 1–30 (2008).
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mechanism of “orderly participation,” the participatory model also
can serve as a guide for China’s ongoing political and administrative
reform. We believe that with further economic and social
development, especially increasing urbanization, the applicability of
participatory governance will continue to expand.
Underlying the development of participatory governance is
the reframing of the state-society relationship. Effective participatory
governance needs a strong society as well as a strong state; it requires
an open government and mature institutions for public participation,
as well as a society with well-developed mechanisms for interest
representation and expression. With the development of the public’s
ability to define, express and argue for its diverse and sometimes
conflicting interests in the processes of policy decision-making,
society can increasingly share the responsibility of public governance
and China can move toward a “participatory society.”
We believe that the development of participatory governance
can improve fairness in the Chinese society. Over more than three
decades of reform, competition among local governments for higher
growth has given rise to China’s miraculous economic development.
But this competition has also led to serious and consistent imbalances
in public policy and to the slighting of many aspects of the public
interest and public opinion. In the decision-making process, many
local officials act in favor of the interests of the party-state
bureaucracy and powerful economic actors while overlooking the
interests and preferences of other less privileged social groups.
Participatory governance promotes more inclusive and equal
representation and the expression of plural interests in the
administrative decision-making process, as well as the realization of
the public interest in specific cases. In the relatively near term, we
expect to see a new wave of competition among local governments
for the advancement of “scientific and democratic decision-making,”
which includes the key aspects of a participatory model of
governance. If this happens, China will witness huge progress in the
development of political civilization after three decades of success in
economic development.
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